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Abstract
The spread of terrorism is a serious concern in national and international security, as its spread
is seen as an existential threat to Western liberal democracies. Understanding and effectively
modelling the spread of terrorism provides useful insight into formulating effective responses. A
mathematical model capturing the theoretical constructs of contagion and diffusion is constructed
for explaining the spread of terrorist activity and used to analyse data from the Global Terrorism
Database from 2000–2016 for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel. Results show that the model iden-
tifies patterns in the diffusion and contagion processes that align with and provide insight into
contemporary events.
1 Introduction
Terrorism is a complicated social phenomenon, and assessing the effectiveness of measures to pre-
vent the proliferation or increase in the rate of terrorist events relies on a model that incorporates a
qualitative and theoretical understanding of the process while maintaining fidelity to the data, hence
accurately reflecting the effects of counter-measures. This paper presents such a model, it incorpo-
rates an accepted theoretical framework and refined elements of previous quantitative models and is
parametrised to allow the extraction of meaningful insights from the results.
There are two aspects to acts of terrorism1 that exacerbate their impact. The first is their relative
rarity (in most contexts), the second is that the clustering of events in time [48, 51, 34, 52, 38, 78,
83, 44, 6] creates the impression of a sudden increase in the rate of terrorism. It is the uncertainty
surrounding the permanence of this increase that causes additional anxiety [80, 40, 14, 15, 2]. Deter-
mining whether the occurrence of a terrorist event is a transient anomaly or a signal of a change in
the rate of events is of great interest and identifying the circumstances around these two possibilities
is a feature of the model presented in this paper. Theoretical models posit the mechanisms of conta-
gion and diffusion as explanations for these patterns of clustering and erratic activity. Each of these
mechanisms has different implications for identifying whether events are part of a persistent increase
in the rate of events or are part of a transient anomaly.
Sociological theories to explain the proliferation of aberrant behaviour through contagion or dif-
fusion2 begin with [47], and appear in discussions of political violence and civil upheaval by the
mid-twentieth century [39], enduring as a viable theoretical model to explain the proliferation of ter-
rorism both spatially and temporally [51, 63, 52, 29, 35, 38, 85, 27, 8, 9, 7, 11]. The mathematical
and statistical concepts of a “contagious” process are similarly well established [26, 57, 21], as are
1The definition of terrorism is contested (see [73, 37], for an entre´ into this discussion), in this paper the term “terrorist”
and “terrorism” refer only to the fact that the events analysed in this paper are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database
[56].
2The distinction between diffusion and contagion can be difficult to discern in the sociological literature. In some
cases the terms seem to be used interchangeably. This is specifically acknowledged in [51] which concludes by drawing
a distinction between the two mechanisms.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
02
52
7v
4 
 [s
tat
.A
P]
  1
2 F
eb
 20
19
the concepts of diffusion [22, 18, 61, 79, 62]. The application of a model based approach to describ-
ing the dynamics of terrorism emerges in the social sciences with [13], followed by the development
of theoretically based models [63, 17, 28, 29], building on theoretical constructs for social conta-
gion, diffusion, and group learning. These models demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of the
theories and mathematical models but focus on a simple mathematical mechanisms to describe the
proliferation of violence. Contemporary to these models the Hawkes self-exciting process model
[32, 31] and its cluster process interpretation [33] are put forth as theoretical constructs with limited
demonstrations of their application. What is important about these models is that they demonstrate a
higher degree of mathematical sophistication than the ad hoc or heuristic models of [63, 17, 28, 29],
having nice mathematical properties (e.g. stationarity), while accurately reflecting the theoretical
understanding of the role behavioural contagion plays in the rate of terrorist incidents.
While the distinction between diffusion and contagion as mechanisms for the proliferation of
terrorism is not always clear [51] identifies diffusion as the increase in the rate of events due to non-
terrorist events that elicit a collective reaction among individuals or groups in a population without
observation or communication of others’ behaviour. This is distinct from contagion as it contains
no element of imitation or the modelling of behaviour, rather it implies a shift in an individual’s or
groups propensity to engage in terrorism as a reaction to external events. If these shifts in patterns of
behaviour are enduring, then the mean of the process can shift, implying the possibility that diffusion
can be a non-stationary process. Originally, [51] applied this theoretical model, in conjunction with
contagion, to explain the proliferation of riots in US cities during the late 1960’s. But it is reasonable
to extend this to terrorism more broadly, including explanations for groups as well as individuals, as
diffusion in [51] is a reaction to what [14] refers to as precipitants, or precipitating events, identified
as an element in the proliferation of terrorism. The resulting theoretical model states that terrorism
proliferates through two mechanisms: contagion, which is a function of the influence that past terrorist
events has on the future event rate, and diffusion, which is a function of exogenous events or processes.
This serves as the basis for the model presented in this paper, which describes the combined effects
of diffusion and contagion as a convolution of two process: a non-homogeneous Poisson process for
diffusion (as originally proposed in [53]) and a negative-binomial Hawkes self-exciting process for
contagion. Results show that under the cluster process representation the model can identify distinct
behaviours in the two processes that may be attributable to observable differences in the contexts and
populations, providing useful insight into the actual phenomenon and data.
The balance of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 derives a Bayesian hierarchical model,
incorporating diffusion and contagion components, for the convolution of a Poisson and negative-
binomial processes. Section 3 provides the computational details of the model. Section 4 presents
the results of applying the model to multiple data sets. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the
results and their interpretation.
2 Model
The daily number of terrorist events can be described as the sum of events from two processes, a
diffusion process and a contagion process. As proposed in [51], a Poisson distribution is used for the
diffusion process and a negative-binomial distribution is used for the contagion process resulting in a
convolution model for the total number of daily events. A closed form for the likelihood of a Poisson-
Negative-Binomial convolution is not available. This is addressed by using a Bayesian hierarchical
model that facilitates computation by exploiting the relationship between the Poisson, gamma, and
negative-binomial distributions.
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2.1 A Hierarchical Model for the Convolution of Diffusion and Contagion Pro-
cesses
Evaluating a model for the convolution of two Poisson processes is straightforward, as it is simply
another Poisson process with an explicit and easily evaluated likelihood. However, preliminary data
analysis and results from [87] confirm that data from the contagion process are better fit using a
negative binomial distribution. The resulting Poisson-Negative-Binomial convolution model has no
closed form likelihood function, complicating analysis. This complication is addressed by noting that
the total number of events on day t, Yt = Ydt + Y
c
t is the sum of the number of events from the diffusion
and contagion processes, respectively, and specifying a hierarchical convolution model,
Ydt ∼ Pois
(
λdt
)
(1)
Yct |λct ∼ Pois
(
λct
)
(2)
λct ∼ Ga
(
σ2,
µct
σ2
)
. (3)
Note that (3) is parametrised so that E(λct ) = µ
c
t , and that multiplying (2) and (3) and integrating out
λct yields
Yct ∼ Neg − Binom
(
µct , σ
2
)
, (4)
where µct is parametrised as the expected value.
If the partitioning of Yt into Ydt and Y
c
t were known, then the parameters for the two processes
could be estimated using the (1) and (4). If Yt|λct ∼ Pois(λdt + λct ) as implied by (1) and (2) then from
[16]
Ydt |Yt, λct ∼ Binom
(
Yt,
λdt
λdt + λ
c
t
)
, (5)
which can be used to stochastically attribute events to diffusion and contagion. These results can be
used to construct a hierarchical model and an MCMC scheme that does not require explicit evaluation
of the likelihood for Yt, but instead uses the partitioned data with (1) and (4) to draw samples from
the posterior distributions of their parameters. Details of the implementation are in Section 3.
2.2 Incorporating Exogenous and Endogenous Effects
The model presented in (1)–(4) can be extended to allow variation in diffusion and contagion rates
due to other factors. [28] divides these factors into endogenous, associated with the contagion process
(e.g., timing, casualties, attack characteristics), and exogenous effects that influence the diffusion
process (e.g., what [14] refers to as precipitating events or preconditions); thus exogenous effects are
present in the diffusion process and endogenous effects in the contagion process.
Following the convention for generalised linear models, the rate of the diffusion process is there-
fore modelled
λdt = exp(xtβ), (6)
where the row vector xt contains the exogenous covariates at time t and β is a column vector of
coefficients. The expected rate of the contagion process µct from (3) is
µct =
∑
s<t
δsYsg(t − s;φ). (7)
The decay function g(·;φ) controls how long (in days) the influence from past events persists, and is
a non-negative function defined for the days u ∈ N such that ∑∞1 g(u) = 1. Following [64, 86] g(·;φ)
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is a shifted negative-binomial pmf, parametrised in terms of mean and scale. The endogenous effects
coefficient δs (also termed the volatility parameter) is equal to the expected number of additional
events generated by each event on day s. As δs ≥ 0 the effects of covariates can be incorporated as in
(6) defining
δs = exp(wsη), (8)
where ws is a row vector of endogenous covariates at time s and η a column vector of coefficients; thus
the contagion rate µct is the average of the number of events prior to time t scaled by the endogenous
effects coefficient and weighted by the decay function g.
It is useful to note that the conditional expectation of Yt
λt|λdt = λdt + λct (9)
= λdt +
∑
s<t
δsYsg(t − s;φ) (10)
is similar to the Hawkes self-exciting process intensity function [32, 31], but extends it by allowing
λdt and δs to vary according to the exogenous and endogenous effects.
2.3 Selecting Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
Incorporating the exogenous effects into the diffusion term requires either an apriori knowledge of the
precipitating events, or a flexible data-driven non-parametric model that can approximate their effects.
The latter approach is followed in this paper to demonstrate the utility of this model as an exploratory
tool for identifying possible precipitating events. This is accomplished by using penalised b-splines
[46], where the vector xt in (6) is a set of basis functions evaluated at time t.
The endogenous covariates are constructed from the event characteristics that affect their “conta-
giousness”. Exploratory data analysis led to the selection of the number of fatalities as the variable
describing the endogenous effects. Because the exact form of the relationship between fatalities and
contagiousness is not known, the covariates wi in (8) are also modelled with penalised b-splines (over
the natural log of the number of fatalities plus 1), allowing a data-driven exploration of the relation-
ship.
3 Computation and Implementation
As discussed in Section 2 the data can be partitioned stochastically using (5) at each iteration of
an MCMC scheme to sample from the posterior distribution of the model parameters. The MCMC
scheme can be completed given prior distributions for the parameters φ,β, η and σ2.
3.1 Priors
The likelihood for the partitioned data are derived from (1) and (4), and the Bayesian model is com-
pleted by specifying prior distributions for the parameters. The parameters β and η are given penalised
first-order random walk priors as defined in [46] which encourages parsimony and discourages over-
fitting by penalising the differences between parameter values, i.e. for a set of spline basis functions
X if all the parameter values β are equal, then Xβ is a constant. This expresses the prior belief that the
diffusion rate is constant over time and that there is no relationship between the number of fatalities
and the contagiousness of an event.
pi(β|ρ) ∝ exp
(
−ρ
2
β′Kβ
)
(11)
pi(η|γ) ∝ exp
(
−γ
2
η′Bη
)
(12)
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where K and B are first-order random walk penalty matrices, e.g.
K =

1 −1
−1 2 −1
. . .
. . .
. . .
−1 2 −1
−1 1

.
Vague proper gamma distributions are specified as conjugate hyper-priors for ρ and γ as suggested in
[46]. The remaining priors are
pi(β) ∝ 1 (13)
pi(η) ∝ 1 (14)
pi(σ2) =
1
(1 + σ2)2
(15)
pi(φ) = Π2i=1
1
(1 + φi)2
. (16)
3.2 Computation
Mixture models can be difficult to evaluate as identifiability issues can cause poor mixing or conver-
gence of MCMC chains [70]. This is addressed using additional re-sampling steps for β and η as
suggested in [71]. For example, for β at the ith iteration:
i) Sample β(i) ∼ pi(β|ρ,Yd)
ii) Sample β∗ ∼ N(β(i), αI )
iii) Let β(i) = β∗ w.p. min
(
1, pi(Y
d |β∗)
pi(Yd |β(i))
)
.
The value α is chosen to set the acceptance rate to between 20% – 40%, as recommended in [71]. The
rest of the implementation is a straightforward Gibbs MCMC scheme using a hit-and-run sampler
with slice sampling [76] for those parameters without conjugate conditional posterior distributions.
4 Results
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source, publicly available dataset that contains
records of terrorist events from 1970 [55], containing as at its most recent reporting year, 2016,
over 170,000 cases each with up to 120 variables. GTD data from the period 2000–2016 from the
countries of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel, shown in Figures 1, 5, and 9 were analysed using the
model derived in Sections 2 and 3. Results indicate that the diffusion and contagion processes are
identifiable and demonstrate distinct patterns that align with theoretical constructs and the historical
narrative. Furthermore, the model suggests that the excitation effect varies significantly with the
number of fatalities.
4.1 Afghanistan
Figure 2 shows the median and 95% credible interval of the diffusion rate µdt for Afghanistan from
2000 through 2016, with some key events annotated.
The diffusion rate is quite low in the period of de facto Taliban rule over a majority of Afghanistan
from 1998 until the initial US-led invasion in October 2001 [66]. After the invasion, activity begins
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Figure 1: Events in Afghanistan 2000-2016
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Figure 2: µdt for Afghanistan 2000-2016
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to slowly increase as the Taliban began re-organising and re-grouping, and beginning an insurgency
and engaging in guerilla warfare [82, 24]. By 2006 US forces were replaced by NATO coalition
forces in southern Afghanistan, with the goal of forming Provincial Reconstructions Teams to begin
rebuilding Afghanistan and stabilise the political situation [3]. Multiple operations by US and NATO
forces to push Taliban forces out of the provinces met with varying degrees of success over the next
few years as the US increased troop levels by over 80% in an attempt to defeat the Taliban [58].
Despite these efforts, by the end of 2009 the Taliban’s strength had returned to near pre-invasion
levels [59] and intelligence showed a steady increase in security incidents [5]. A slight decrease in
the rate of incidents in 2010 coincides with the initiation of peace talks with the Haqqani network
by Hamid Kharzai in March of 2010 and the Afghan Peace Jirga [67]. Increases in US troop levels
continued in 2010 as part of a “surge” strategy with shift to target Taliban leadership resulting in
the capture or killing of more than 900 low- to mid- level Taliban leaders [84]. There is a sharp
upturn in µdt starting in 2011 and coinciding with the death of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 and the
announcement of US troop withdrawals [45], followed by similar announcements and withdrawals by
other coalition members. As the diffusion rate continued to increase, in May of 2012 NATO coalition
members endorsed an exit strategy transferring responsibility for security to Afghan forces by mid-
2013 [68, 20] which occurred on 18 June 2013 [36]. On 26 October 2014 Britain and the US formally
ended their combat operations, handing over their last remaining bases to Afghan control [77, 41].
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Figure 3: δs vs. Fatalities in Afghanistan 2000-2016
The contagion process is best explored in detail through the concepts of volatility and resilience as
defined in [87]. Volatility is the expected number of events that occur via contagion after each event,
this is parametrised as δs. Figure 3 shows the median and 95% credible interval for the endogenous
effects coefficient δs as a function of the number of fatalities due to events at time s. When the
expected volatility is greater than 1, each event is expected to produce more than one subsequent
event and the contagion process becomes non-stationary or “explosive”. The values for the median
of δs provide evidence of a stationary contagion process (i.e. a volatility consistently less than 1).
There is an upward trend in the excitation effect for events with greater than 50 fatalities, but the
limited amount of data reflected in the large credible intervals at the limits, makes it difficult to verify.
Considering the number of fatalities as a measure of attack size, and an indirect measure of the
resources allocated towards an attack, δs becomes a measure of operational capability. Assuming that
large attacks are a substantial drain on resources to mount future attacks, then δs would be expected
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to decrease with the number of fatalities. The fact that it is approximately constant would seem
to indicate that large attacks are not a significant drain on resources or capacity. The increase in
frequency and lethality of attacks over time, indicated by the near constant values of δs, reflects the
Taliban’s resurgence during this time period. The parameters of the decay function g(·) (see 2.2)
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Afghanistant Decay Function
Figure 4: Estimated decay function, g(·;φ), for Afghanistan 2000-2016.
describe resilience, or the duration and intensity of the contagion effect. The contagion effect can be
explained using the language of [33] describing the self-exciting model as a cluster process where
events serve as a “parent” producing “children” through the contagion process (which subsequently
become “parents” have “children” of their own). The decay function for Afghanistan in Figure 4
(median with 95% credible interval) shows that the duration of the contagion effect of an event is
limited to a few days. The expected time until a “child” event (i.e. an event attributed to the contagion
effect of a previous, or “parent” event) is between 1.46 and 1.70 days after the “parent” event (95%
credible interval) with an expected value of 1.6 days. The probability of a “child” event occurring
more than 3 days after the originating event is less than 0.05.
4.2 Iraq
Figure 6 shows the posterior median and 95% credible interval for the diffusion rate µdt in Iraq for the
period 2000–2016.
Similar to Afghanistan there were few events in Iraq prior to the US-led invasion in 2003. The
US-led invasion of Iraq began on 20 March 2003 and proceeded rapidly with the capital of Baghdad
falling to US troops on 9 April 2003 and the declaration of the end of major combat operations on 1
May 2003 [42]. Saddam Hussein remained at large until 13 December 2003, and significant pockets
of resistance remained despite the coalition’s efforts to establish a stable post-invasion democracy
[30]. After the end of conventional fighting, an insurgency began. Initially fuelled by Ba’ath Party
loyalists the insurgency soon drew religious radicals and regular citizens. The violence came to a
head on 31 March 2004 when insurgents in Fallujah captured and killed four US private military
contractors resulting in the First Battle of Fallujah from 1 April 2004 until 1 May 2004, a campaign
to secure Fallujah and capture the insurgents responsible for the deaths of the US contractors [12].
The Second Battle of Fallujah from 7 November 2004 to 23 December 2004 followed as some of
the bloodiest fighting in Iraq, and the first time US forces fought forces made up exclusively of
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insurgents and not the remnants of the Iraqi Republican Guard [69]. In 2005 the Iraqi Transitional
Government was elected and charged with writing a new constitution. Despite this insurgent activity
continued to escalate, including attacks on the Abu Ghraib prison and fighting around Baghdad and
the Euphrates valley [69]. In January of 2007 President Bush announced an increase in both troop
levels and reconstruction efforts, this “surge” strategy under the command of the newly appointed
commander of the Iraq Multinational Force, Gen. David Petraeus [10]. In March of 2007 the Iraqi
Parliament enacted legislation calling on the US to set a timetable for withdrawal of their forces [65].
By September of 2007 plans were in place to reduce US troop levels to pre-surge numbers [23]. On
4 December 2008, the Iraqi government approved the US-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement requiring
US forces withdraw from Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009 and all US forces be out of Iraq by 31 December
2011. US forces began their withdraw at the end of June 2009, handing over 38 bases to Iraqi control
and removing all forces from Baghdad. In October of 2011 the departure of the remaining US troops
was announced, and on 18 December 2011 the last US troops left Iraq. After the withdrawal of US
troops the insurgency increased dramatically as Sunni militant groups stepped up attacks of the Shia
majority [43]. Between 2011 and 2013 the Arab Spring inspires uprisings across the Arab world,
including Syria where it ignites a civil war and gives rise to the Islamic State [19, 72].
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Figure 7: δs vs. Fatalities in Iraq 2000-2016
The variation in volatility as a function of fatalities, as shown in Figure 7, is pronounced. There
is an obvious trend indicating that volatility decreases as the number of fatalities increases. The
model suggests that events producing a large number of fatalities tend to generate almost no contagion
effects. However, for events causing 0 or 1 fatalities the median value of δs is greater than 1 indicating
that the contagion is potentially in a non-stationary, explosive state. The trend for the frequency of
events and the number of fatalities is not as strong as it is in Afghanistan, and there are 38 events
with over 100 fatalities, leading to a narrower credible interval at the extremes for δs. This paints a
different picture of the operational capacity. Rather than the steady increase as seen in Afghanistan
by the resurgence of the Taliban, a power vacuum was created after the invasion. The coalition forces
outlawed the ethnic minority Ba’ath party and the disbanded the Iraqi armed forces, many of whom
were eventually integrated into the Islamic State[75]. Initially, the resistance to the occupation had no
central unifying entity, and it wasn’t until the rise of the Islamic State post-2010 and their subsequent
assimilation of other resistance groups that a similar unified force against the occupation existed[50].
This explains both the decrease in volatility with casualties, and the non-stationarity for events with
10
0 or 1 fatality. The resilience of activity in Iraq is described in the decay function g(·) shown in
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Iraq Decay Function
Figure 8: Estimated decay function, g(·;φ), for Iraq 2000-2016.
Figure 8 (median with 95% credible interval) and the parameters of the function g(·). The duration of
contagion is limited to a few days, the expected time until a contagion event is 1.4 (1.31, 1.47) days
and the probability of a contagion event occurring more than 3 days after the originating event is less
that 0.05.
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Figure 9: Events in Israel 2000-2016
4.3 Israel
The history, context, and model results for Israel differ from those of Afghanistan and Iraq. This is
reflected in Figure 10 showing the posterior median and 95% credible interval of µdt for Israel from
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2000 to 2016. There is significant variation in the diffusion rate, but it never reaches the intensity of
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Afghanistan and Iraq. There are numerous events that could be identified as possible precipitants, a
few have been noted here that align with the data to provide some reference to the results. There is a
steep increase in µdt following Prime Minister Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem [25].
Shortly after this visit the Second Intifada began, a period of increased Israeli-Palestinian violence,
and the peak value of µdt , of approximately 0.15, is reached. After this peak there is a steady decrease
surrounding a three-month cease fire announced by Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad on 29 June 2003
[4]. There is a second peak in µdt near the start of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War [54]. The lowest
value for µdt is reached in September of 2010 around the time of the Sharm el-Sheikh peace summit
[1]. After 2010 there is again an increase in µdt culminating around the time Israel launched Operation
Protective Edge, to stop the launch of rockets into Israel from Gaza [81].
The variation of the volatility as measured by δs for events in Israel follows a similar decreasing
pattern as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The volatility never exceeds 1 indicating that the contagion process
is stationary. While the number of fatalities per event tends to increase over time in Afghanistan, it
is decreasing in Israel over the same period. The decay function in Figure 12 (median with 95%
credible interval) shows that the duration of contagion in Israel is limited to a few days. Specifically,
the expected time until a contagion event is around 1.6 (1.39, 1.82) days and the probability of a
contagion event occurring more than 4 days after the originating event is less than 0.05.
5 Discussion
Understanding the dynamics of terrorism is a problem at the forefront of concerns at all levels of
society, from policy makers to popular discourse the subject of terrorism by its very nature elicits a
visceral need for an explanation. There has been substantial efforts to map and explore how terrorism
spreads in space over time. Research such as [60] used data from Wikileaks documents to geocode
and map the patterns of violence in Afghanistan from 2004 through 2009, [49] conducted a similar
study of activity in Iraq finding that there appeared to be a reciprocal relationship between insurgents
and counter insurgency activity, while [74] takes in a broader set of contexts, and observed that the
spread of violence mainly manifests as either an increase in geographical area, or as a displacement
in space.
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While these papers provide useful insights and clarity to the discussion of events by focus on
exploratory techniques to describe the patterns, the focus of this paper is to use a statistical mod-
elling approach to identify distinct differences in the patterns of proliferation, and make inference on
those differences. The distinction being that in this paper the terms diffusion and contagion refer to
mechanisms of proliferation rather than observable phenomena.
Results from the models presented in this paper provide two immediately evident results: in gen-
eral, key shifts in the diffusion rate coincide with key events in the historical narrative; that is the
notion of precipitants as exogenous factors is evident in the models, and endogenous excitation ef-
fects tends to decrease as the number of fatalities increase. While the use of Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Israel as examples may seem limiting, as the results of these analyses may not be extensible to other
countries, the results of applying this model to these data and others not included (Turkey, Indonesia,
and Colombia) show that the model can be applied broadly.
The results for all three countries agree with the existing narratives. Both Afghanistan and Iraq
were under the rule of repressive regimes prior to invasion by US and Allied forces. Occupation rule
in both countries resulted in increased violence which escalated rapidly after the withdrawal of forces
and the ceding of authority for security to local forces. The difference between the two is that resis-
tance in Afghanistan came primarily in the form of a reassertion of the deposed regime, the Taliban.
In Iraq the regime of Saddam Hussein, including the Iraqi army and his Ba’ath party, were system-
atically dismantled in an effort to create a democratic secular government, creating a power vacuum
and exacerbating sectarian tensions between the Shia majority and Sunni minority, contributing to
the violence and unrest. This difference is manifest in the differences in the endogenous effects or
volatility as measured by δs in Figures 3 and 7. The volatility in Afghanistan is relatively constant,
with little decrease or change with the number of fatalities, this indicates that there is likely no in-
hibitory or “blow-back” effects for large scale events. Coupled with the information that the fatalities
and frequency of events both increase in time (as the Taliban consolidates and rebuilds post-invasion)
the stable volatility also indicates evidence that the execution of large-scale events is not an excessive
drain on resources or capacity to attack. In Iraq the volatility shows more variation, as δs decreases
with the number of fatalities. The volatility in excess of 1 for events with 1 or 0 fatalities reflects
that numerous groups or individuals were responsible for the events. The decrease in volatility with
fatalities reflects either an inhibitory effect for large scale events, or the limited resources of groups
or individuals to act. In either case the distinction between these patterns is informative.
The pattern in Israel reflects a relatively stable situation, where terrorist activity ebbs and flows.
A precarious peace process exists between Israeli and Palestinian claims over the region. Describing
the situation as complex is an understatement. In reality, the Israelis and Palestinians share not only
claims of sovereignty over the region, but also cultural and economic ties. The ebb and flow of terrorist
activity is a part of daily life and exists almost as an extension of political discourse. Increases in
activity often result in new rounds of negotiation, or at least proportional responses rather than all-out
offences. This is reflected in both the variation of the diffusion rate µdt , which does not reach the levels
of intensity as in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the volatility which is consistently less than 1, indicating
a stationary process, and the decrease in volatility as a function of fatalities. Given the relatively low
diffusion rate, and the historical context, where violence is often used to exert political pressure, it is
more likely that the decrease in volatility as fatalities increase is likely due to an inhibitory effect.
The classification of mechanisms for the proliferation of terrorist activity into the categories of
diffusion and contagion provides a useful framework for analysing activity. The intent in developing
these mathematical models was to create a means of both analysing and classifying data, but also
to test and measure the effectiveness of counter-measures. The correspondence between the model
results and the existing narratives for the countries analysed validate the use of these models, both
conceptually and mathematically. The validation of these models also has important implications for
counter-measures. First is the distinction between endogenous and exogenous effects, and their roles
in the contagion and diffusion processes. Second is the implication that the dominant mechanism
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should guide counter-measures, both counter-terrorism efforts and counter-radicalisation efforts. The
contagion process is characterised by small-scale dynamics and is governed by endogenous effects,
i.e. it is the characteristics of these events and immediate or tactical counter-measures that have po-
tential to influence the contagion process. The diffusion process is associated with exogenous factors,
or large-scale socio-economic and political factors, these are factors that take a different, more strate-
gic set of counter-measures, in order to effect change. Both cases require different approaches, a
more tactical approach for addressing factors that effect the contagion process, and a more strategic
approach to address factors effecting the diffusion process. If, as is likely, real-world situations are
a mixture of both diffusion and contagion then counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies
should be shaped to address the two processes and their particular balance in each setting. The models
here provide a useful tool for analysis to both assess the mechanisms at work in any given context and
to measure the effectiveness of enacted counter measures. In practice, counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalisation activities typically carry the potential of negative consequences, an understanding of
the mitigation and prevention options and a method of measuring their effectiveness is important to
minimising possible negative effects. Thus the utility of the models proposed here is beyond academic
and offer substantial benefit to real-world policy makers.
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